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1 Introduction
The reports of the United Nations’ Millennium
Project recognise that proposals to increase aid
could be hampered by lack of capacity in recipient
countries, but say very little about the capacity of
donors.1This article seeks to demonstrate that donor
capacity warrants equal concern. It focuses on sub-
SaharanAfrica, which is the region where there has
been least progress in achieving the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and to which much
of the increased aid is thus likely to be channelled.2
There is substantial evidence to suggest that,
while the problems of capacity inAfrican countries
are great and cannot be ignored, the manner in
which aid is delivered is just as much a problem.
Van de Walle and Johnston (1996), summarising
a study of aid effectiveness in seven African
countries, show how aid often weakens rather than
strengthens local institutions. Similarly, Lancaster
(1999: 3–4) concludes from a study of the
performance of eight major donors in Africa that,
‘contrary to widely held views … themain problem
is the lack of capacity on the part of aid agencies to
undertake the kind of interventions they have
attempted’. These agencies, she says, ‘have often
lacked the technical experience, local knowledge,
staff, and appropriate processes to manage such
projects and programs effectively’. Bräutigam and
Knack (2004) conclude from an analysis of data
for 32 African countries, that aid has a negative
impact on the quality of governance and that this
is due in large part to the manner in which it is
delivered.
As the quotation from Lancaster implies, the
question of whether donors have the capacity to
deliver increased quantities of aid effectively is not
just about whether sufficient financial and
manpower resources can be mobilised. As with
recipient governments, it is also necessary to ask
whether donor agencies have the necessary
organisational structures and procedures,
knowledge and skills, and attitudes. In our view,
the answer to this question is that they do not.We
shall demonstrate this by examining five aspects of
the design and implementation of donor-funded
interventions that we consider particularly critical
in determining aid effectiveness, namely:
1. The extent of ownership of, and therefore
commitment to, the intervention in the recipient
country
2. The appropriateness of the intervention to the
environment of the recipient country
3. The organisational structures and procedures
through which interventions are implemented
and monitored
4. The degree of flexibility in programme design
and implementation
5. The quality of technical expertise within the
donor agency.
We shall support our argument with references
to the literature and with examples of both good
and bad practice drawn from our own experience
in sub-Saharan Africa over the last three decades.
2 Local ownership and
commitment
Ownership and commitment go hand in hand.We
use the term“ownership” tomean that the recipient
has not merely agreed to an externally supported
intervention, but is genuinely committed to it.Van
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deWalle and Johnston (1996: 54) say that ‘recipient
governments can be said to “own” an aid activity
when they believe that it empowers them and serves
their interest’, whileUnsworth (2001: 11)maintains
that “local ownership”must mean “local leadership”.
The reasons why ownership and commitment are
so important are well known and documented.As
van de Walle and Johnston (1996: 54) explain,
‘from a sense of ownership flows the willingness to
commit real resources to ensure the activity’s success,
to solve problems that emerge during
implementation, and to sustain the activity after
the withdrawal of aid’. However, the conclusion
from their study is that, although ‘the importance
of ownership is widely acknowledged [by donors]
as essential to the success and sustainability of
development efforts’, in reality they ‘still tend to
dominate the project cycle and pay inadequate
attention to the preferences of the government or
project beneficiaries’ (van de Walle and Johnston
1996: 54–5).
Our own experience supports this conclusion.
We have encountered some externally supported
interventions with a high degree of local ownership.
Examples include:
● Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Action Programme,
widely regarded as one of the most successful
attempts to utilise debt-relief funds for poverty
alleviation (Amis 2002)
● Zimbabwe’s local government capacity-building
programme, which received external support for
12 years and was only brought to a halt by the
deteriorating political situation in Zimbabwe
(Mellors et al. 2002)
● Ethiopia’s current public service delivery capacity-
building programmes
● AnNGO-funded community development initiative
in the Binga District of Zimbabwe, which
demonstrates the importance of ownership at
community as well as national level (Conyers
and Cumanzala 2004).
In all these cases, the recipient organisation
identified the need for the intervention and played
the lead role in its design and implementation;
external aid was merely a means of enabling it to
achieve its objective.
However, we have also come across many cases
where there has not been sufficient ownership or
commitment and where the blame for this must
rest in large part with the donor. For example, in
Nigeria, the Department for International
Development’s (DFID) attempts to fund state-level
public sector reform programmes have had very
little success because of lack of ownership and
commitment by the state governments. And in
Uganda some donors have played a highly proactive
role in the design of local government support
programmes,3 and there is a risk of the same thing
happening with similar programmes currently being
designed in South Sudan.
Why do donors persist in supporting
interventions that lack the necessary ownership
and commitment?There are twomain reasons.One
is insufficient understanding of the policy
environment in the recipient country. For example,
DFID’s decision to fund state-level reforms inNigeria
was based on the assumption that the election of a
democratic government was in itself enough to
provide a fertile environment for public sector
reform– an assumption that they later found to be
false (Heymans and Pycroft 2003).We shall return
to this issue later in the article.The other, and usually
more important, reason is the pressure on donor
agencies to spendmoney. This pressure stems from
a combination of factors: spending targets set by
the donor government (often for political rather
than “developmental” reasons), competition
between donors and the need for individual agency
staff to justify their own existence.
3 Appropriate interventions
Africa’s history is littered with examples of
inappropriate development interventions
introduced by “outsiders” – from the British colonial
government’s notorious groundnut scheme in the
1950s to the World Bank’s structural adjustment
programmes in the 1980s. Other documented
examples include the ‘training and visit’ agricultural
extension system (Hulme 1992), public sector
reform programmes (Polidano 2001), and “new”
publicmanagement (Manning 2001).An example
of inappropriate “new” publicmanagement practices
is the performance appraisal system used in
Uganda’s World Bank-funded Local Government
Development Programme, which encourages
“upward” and “external” rather than “downward”
and “internal” accountability and requires somuch
organisation and financial support that there is no
way it will be sustained when external funding –
and pressure – is removed (DIP 2002).4
IDS Bulletin 36.3 Increased Aid: Minimising Problems, Maximising Gains
84
Interventions like this fail for two reasons. First,
they are incompatible with the local physical,
socioeconomic and/or political environment.Thus,
Manning (2001: 302–3) explains how “new” public
management reforms have tended to fail for the
same reasons as the “old” ones did – for example,
lack of skills and resources, corruption and undue
political influence. Equally important, however, is
the fact that they are imposed from outside rather
than generated locally. This relates to the earlier
point about ownership. As Bräutigam and Knack
(2004: 261–2) point out, the process of analysing
problems and identifying appropriate solutions is
an essential component of the concept of
“ownership”. It is also the only way in which
Africans will find sustainable solutions to their
development problems.
This point has long been recognised. For
example, Dumont (1962), in his book False Start
in Africa, highlighted the need for ‘local’ solutions
to ‘local’ problems while, in another classic text,
Schumacher (1973) emphasised the importance of
self-learning.More recently, it has been increasingly
emphasised by African political leaders and
intellectuals. It is reflected in attempts to find an
African alternative to structural adjustment in the
late 1990s (Sogge 2002: 68), in the formulation of
the New Partnership for African Development
(NEPAD), and in theAfricanUnion’s insistence that
it take the lead in resolving conflicts in areas such
as the Sudan.5
Why then do donors continue to introduce
inappropriate solutions? Inadequate understanding
of the environment in the recipient country is again
part of the problem.However, there are two other
reasons. First, many donor policy documents –
including the reports of theMillennium Project –
give the impression that the answers to Africa’s
development problems are known.6 In reality,
however, most of the problems are complex and
there are no easy or obvious solutions; if there were,
theMDGs would have been achieved in the previous
millennium. Second, current aid discourse, like
“new” public management discourse in general
(Hood 1991, 1998), is characterised by the constant
“invention” of new “fashions” – that is,new solutions
or approaches, which displace the previous ones
before the latter have been properly tested. Recent
changes in DFID’s governance policy are a case in
point.7 More often than not, these fashions are not
really new; they are merely new (and often more
complicated) ways of expressing old wisdom.
Moreover, there is amistaken tendency to assume
that they are universally applicable – the “one size
fits all” approach.
4 Organisational structures and
procedures
One of the most widely acknowledged problems
of donor-funded interventions is that donors have
their own procedures for designing, approving,
monitoring and evaluating the activities that they
fund, procedures that inevitably differ from those
of recipient organisations.Officials in the recipient
organisations thus have to expendmuch time and
effort learning and following the required
procedures – time and effort that wouldmuch better
be spent on strengthening internal management
systems.8 Since each donor has its own set of
procedures, this problem underlies much of the
wider problem of donor coordination. Bräutigam
andKnack report (2004: 261) that inGhana ‘senior
officials each spent as much as 44 weeks a year
facilitating or participating in donor supervision
missions, time they were unable to devote to their
ministries’ own priorities’, while Amis (2002)
reported a similar situation in Uganda. Our own
experiences inUganda, and also recently in South
Sudan, confirm the problem.
In many cases, donors also require the
establishment of special organisational units to
implement “their” interventions.The impact of these
“parallel structures” is even more damaging, since
they not only divert time and effort from
strengthening existing structures but actually
undermine them. The special units offer higher
salaries and better working conditions than the
existing organisations, and so “poach” the latter’s
most capable staff, thereby reducing organisational
calibre and themorale of remaining staff.This results
in the transfer ofmore responsibilities to the special
units, thus creating a vicious circle of institutional
degradation. Integrated rural development
programmes (Conyers et al. 1988) and social funds
(deHaan 2002) are classic examples of donor-funded
activities operated through parallel structures.
Ironically, such structures are most common in
countries where government institutions are
weakest. They are justified as being the only way
of delivering complex and/or much-needed public
services in such an environment, but the result is
that the weak institutions become even weaker and
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aid dependency increases rather than decreases.
Uganda is a case in point. Parallel structures were
used to spend the large amounts of aid introduced
after Museveni came to power in 1986, because the
administrative infrastructure had been almost totally
destroyed by years of civil war. The results of this
strategy are still evident today. Many government
departments exist in little more than name, since
the most important activities are implemented
through special, donor-subsidised units. The
problem has now been recognised by both donors
and theUganda Government (seeKitabire, this IDS
Bulletin), and steps are being taken to do what
should have been done 20 years ago – develop the
capacity of departmental structures and systems.
Bräutigam andKnack (2004: 262) describe a similar
situation inMali.
There are some relatively positive experiences
from which lessons might be drawn. For example,
inZambia, Zimbabwe andEthiopia we have helped
to establish local government capacity-building
projects that operate through, rather than in parallel
to, existing institutions and involve a considerable
degree of donor coordination (Mellors et al. 2002;
Zimbabwe 1998). InZimbabwe we also assisted the
government to persuade theWorld Bank to allow a
Bank-funded social fund (theZimbabweCommunity
Action Project) to be implemented through local
governments, using the experience gained from the
local government capacity-building programme.
However, even in these cases, donors continued to
require some special management procedures, and
sometimes also special units within the implementing
government agency. Furthermore, our experience
suggests that the coordination of donor efforts can
be a mixed blessing because it is often the donors
rather than the recipient governments that do the
coordinating and this strengthens the influence of
thedonors vis-à-vis thegovernments.Uganda’s Donor
DecentralisationCoordinationCommittee is a good
example (DIP 2002).
The recent trend among many donors to move
from individual projects to sector-wide approaches
(SWAPs), poverty reduction support programmes
(PRSPs) and,most recently, general budget support,
should in theory reduce the problem. However,
experience suggests that this may merely mean that
one set of structures and procedures is replaced by
another, equally complex and time-consuming set.
Berg (1997) argues that sectoral programmes
actually requiremore complex management systems
than individual projects, whileBräutigam andKnack
(2004: 278) confirmour own experience of PRSPs,
notably that:
the extensive conditions required for poor
countries to qualify for debt relief mirror the aid
system itself, with high transaction costs and
extensive use of foreign consultants to develop
the required poverty reduction programs and
plans.
Once again one must ask why, when these
problems are so widespread and well known, they
have persisted so long.Themain reason is that most
donor agencies are large organisations that operate
inmany countries and are accountable to their own
governments or boards of directors; they are
therefore bound by their own operational
procedures and by the need to account for the
money they spend.However, this is often reinforced
by lack of trust in the capacity or commitment of
the recipient organisation.
5 Flexibility of programme design
and implementation
The implementation of development interventions
in Africa is characterised by uncertainty. This
uncertainty often stems not only from the external
environment but also from the nature of the
interventions themselves, which frequently involve
the application of ideas or approaches that have not
been fully tested in the present environment. This
suggests the need for a flexible “process” approach
to programme design and implementation, rather
than a rigid “blueprint” approach. A process
approach allows a project or programme to evolve
in a manner and at a speed that is consistent with
the local environment and for all those involved in
its implementation to learn as they go along and
adapt their activities accordingly (see also Eyben,
this IDS Bulletin).
The need for a process approach has long been
recognised. In the 1980s it featured prominently
in the development literature (Korten 1980;
Lecomte 1984; Rondinelli 1983) and was reflected
in a number of development projects. We were
personally involved in transforming aDFID-funded
integrated rural development project in Zambia
from a “blueprint” to a “process” approach around
that time. This provided a model for similar
transformations of other Zambian Integrated Rural
IDS Bulletin 36.3 Increased Aid: Minimising Problems, Maximising Gains
86
Development Programmes (IRDPs) and for the
design of Zimbabwe’s local government capacity-
building programme (Conyers et al. 1988; Mellors
et al. 2002). Many NGOs also adopt a process
approach when funding small, community-based
projects, where (as Korten emphasised) flexibility
is particularly appropriate.
However, such projects are the exception rather
than the rule. TheWorld Bank is among the worst
offenders. The process of designing and
implementing a Bank-funded project resembles an
industrial production line. There are a series of
mandatory steps that have to be gone through in a
specific sequence and, as far as possible, at a
predetermined pace – irrespective of the nature of
the project or the environment.Once the recipient
government gets on this production line, it is very
difficult to get off it, or even tomodify or delay the
“production” process. In fact, the only modification
the Bank is likely to encourage is to “fast-track” the
process, amove that frequently results in projects
being implemented without sufficient preparation
and/or the necessary degree of recipient ownership
and commitment. As Polidano (2001: 6) says,
‘forcing the pace can lead to disaster. One has to
proceed slowly, pace by pace, watching one’s step
very carefully indeed’.
The problem, once again, is that donor agencies
are driven by their own motives and constraints.
They need a blueprint plan that spells out how,
when and where the money will be spent in order
to access themoney and provide a basis from which
tomonitor implementation performance.And they
need tomove projects along the production line as
quickly as possible in order tomeet spending targets
and justify the continued existence of the sections
and individuals involved.
6 Quality of technical expertise
Donors require technical expertise at various stages
in the aid “delivery” process: assessing the scope
for intervention; assisting the recipient organisation
in detailed project design; providing any technical
support required during implementation; and
monitoring and evaluating progress and impact. In
order to undertake these tasks efficiently and
effectively, they require an in-depth knowledge of
both the country concerned and appropriate
development theory, and they must be able to access
individuals with appropriate skills as and when
required.We have already noted that lack of such
expertise contributes to other capacity problems.
Our own experience suggests that the quality of
donor expertise in sub-Saharan Africa has
deteriorated over the last 25 years. Although the
situation varies fromdonor to donor, there appears
on the whole to be less in-depth understanding of
Africa’s development problems, less ability to
provide expertise as and when required and less
“organisational learning”.
There are several possible reasons for this. One
is the increasing size, centralisation and
“bureaucratisation” ofmany aid agencies (Lancaster
1999: 223–6), which results in staff spendingmore
timemeeting the internalbureaucratic requirements
of the organisation than learning about the
environment of the countries where they work.
Another is the constant pressure for change in such
agencies, including changes in organisational
structure, inpolicies andpriorities and themovement
of staff. This phenomenon, which is related to the
problems of “new” public management discussed
previously,makes it difficult for both individuals and
the organisation as a whole to develop in-depth
knowledge and understanding.A third factor is what
Dichter (2003: 226–38) calls the ‘professionalisation
of development’. According to Dichter, today’s
development professionals differ from their
predecessors: they tend to be specialists rather than
generalists, to regard their work as aprofession rather
than a vocation, and to measure their performance
in terms of career development andpeer recognition
rather than achievements on the ground. Although
he probably exaggerates the differences between the
two groups, he makes a valid point.
In our view, however, themost important reason
for the decline in the quality of technical expertise,
and one that has received very little attention in the
literature, is that aid agencies now contract out so
much of their work to private consultants. Until
the mid-1980s, agencies such as DFID (then the
Overseas Development Administration, ODA) used
in-house staff for most policy formulation and
project identification, design and management
activities. Moreover, if technical assistance was
needed for project implementation, personnel were
employed directly, usually from a pool of
experienced professionals who were already known
to the organisation.Consultants were only used to
fill specialised gaps or undertake activities like
evaluation, which require an independent view.
But today, consultants are employed to do anything,
Aid Ineffectiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Problem of Donor Capacity
87
from developing policy and identifying possible
areas of intervention to detailed project design and
the actual management of development projects.
This practice, which is characteristic not just of
aidmanagement but of current publicmanagement
practice in general, creates two major problems:
1. Knowledge and expertise is no longer
accumulated in the agencies themselves, but in
the consultants. There is a vast reservoir of
knowledge among consultants – and in their
countless reports. However, because the
consultants are constantly moving from agency
to agency and job to job and their reports are
not “internalised” within the agency, this
knowledge is not used to influence aid activities
in a consistent or coherent manner.
2. The procedures by which consultants are hired,
especially the prolonged process of competitive
bidding, makes it very difficult to get the right
person in the right place at the right time. The
system might work if there was a pool of
appropriately qualified consultants ready and
waiting to go whenever and wherever they were
needed; but consultants cannot afford to sit
around waiting for work in this way.9
Constraints on space prevent a more detailed
discussion of this issue here, but in our view it is
of critical importance in determining aid
effectiveness.
7 Conclusions
It is evident from the literature and our own
experience that, in order to increase aid effectiveness
inAfrica, theremust be changes in donor structures
and procedures, knowledge and skills and attitudes.
It is essential that donors:
● support only those interventions that
demonstrate genuine recipient ownership and
commitment;
● promote interventions that are appropriate to
the local environment;
● work through the recipient country’s existing
management structures and procedures rather
than their own;
● adopt a flexible “process” approach; and
● enhance their technical capacity to do the above
by strengthening in-house knowledge and
expertise and reducing the use of consultants.
However, it is equally evident that there aremajor
obstacles to such changes. Aid agencies are
constrained by the organisational structures and
procedures of their own governments (which in
turn reflect global trends in public management
practice), by the need to be accountable to these
governments – and ultimately to the taxpayers, and
by the non-humanitarian motives for providing
aid.Moreover, and probably most important, there
aremany people with vested interests in the existing
systems – including not only aid officials and
consultants from the donor countries but alsomany
people in recipient countries who benefit personally
from the current ineffective practices.
Are we prepared to defy these constraints and
make the necessary changes in order tomeet Africa’s
very real humanitarian needs? If we are not, the
prospects are bleak. Pushingmoremoney through
a defective system is wasteful and could do more
harm than good.
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Notes
* We would like to thankDavid Pudsey for the contribution
he has made to our thinking over the years and his
comments on this article.
1. For example, the Overview of its 2005 report, Investing
in Development, has a short section on ‘Key measures to
improve aid delivery’, which focuses on the content of
aid programmes; it does not address any of the issues in
this article.
2. For a detailed analysis of the lack of progress in sub-
Saharan Africa, see Sahn and Stifel (2003).
3. In one case a donor persisted in designing a support
project when there was only lukewarm support from the
government, while in another the government was forced
to agree to amend draft local government tax legislation
as a pre-condition for proceeding with negotiations for
a World Bank-funded programme.
4. The appraisal system provides the basis for the allocation
of development funds to the country’s local authorities.
The performance of the approximately 950 local
authorities is appraised against a complex set of up to 80
criteria.
5. There are indications that it will also play a prominent
role in the forthcoming report of the Commission for
Africa.
6. TheWorld Bank’s annualWorldDevelopment Reports are
another prime example.
7. In the space of a few years, the emphasis has switched
from “organisational development” to “institutional
development”, and then to “drivers of change” – which
appears now also to have been replaced, but with what
is not yet clear.
8. Of particular importance is the development of financial
systems, since these constitute the basis for planning and
monitoring government activity and thus creating efficient
and accountable governments. However, it is in the
financial sphere that donors are most likely to require
special procedures.
9. The problem is greatest with international consultants,
since they work in many different countries. In the case
of local consultants, it is somewhat easier to develop a
pool of expertise.
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